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Abstract
Tens of millions of young children were left behind by their migrant parents who left to find a job elsewhere to gain a
better income and improve their families' living standards. Many studies suggest that migrant parents should bring their
children rather than leave them behind, especially EU internal migrants. In this short note, we give an economic
reasoning for the choice of migrant parents. Our finding shows that emotionally, bringing the children makes both
children and parents better off; however, economically, that may not be the case. The ambiguity depends on the
forgone opportunity cost, relocation cost of children, children's motivation, and the quality of the public school at the
origin and destination.
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1 Introduction and background
Most national and international migrant parents believe they are fulfilling their duty
to raise their family’s standard of living. They take dirty and hard work, and relocate
from one place to another in order to earn more money for their family. They send
income home to pay for better food and education for their families, especially the
children they have left behind.
In China, about 61 million children—one of every five—has not seen one or both par-
ents for at least three months (All-China Women’s Federation, 20141). In Moldova,
177,000 children live with one or both parents abroad; in Ukraine, migrants left 200,000
children behind; and in Romania, there are about 350,000 left-behind children and
one third are completely alone (2011, ChildrenLeftBehind.eu) 2. In Sri Lanka, migrant
working mothers left behind about one million children (Save the Children, 2006). In
the Philippines, Kakammpi (2004) reports that nearly nine million children are grow-
ing up without at least one parent due to that parents’ migration. In 2002, 13% of
Mexican and almost 22% of Salvadoran immigrants living in the US had children left
behind in their home countries (Cortina and de la Garza, 2004).
It is undeniable that the high amounts of remittances3 sent back by migrants are
an enormous help and contribution to their home countries and families. However,
the children left behind pay a high price, though the remittances may help with chil-
dren’s education and human capital accumulation (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2010;
1See detail in the Dec. 3 2014 report at http://www.womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/1412/715-
1.html. See also The Economist, October 17th 2015, page 29-30.
2http://www.childrenleftbehind.eu/2011/02/left-behind-seminar-in-the-european-parliament/
3The Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016 estimates that International migrants will send $601
billion to their families in their home countries this year, with developing countries receiving $441 billion.
Yanovich’s 2015 Migration Policy Reports Moldova has become reliant on remittances, which equal
nearly US$2 billion, or almost one-quarter of gross domestic product (GDP), according to 2014 World
Bank estimates In Ukraine, migrants sent home an estimated US$9 billion in remittances in 2014, the
largest amount in the region, representing 5.4 percent of GDP.
Bansak and Chezum, 2009; De Brauw and Giles, 2008).
The United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) studies suggest that chil-
dren and adolescents left behind may be at greater risk to drug abuse, teenage preg-
nancy, psychosocial problems, and violent behavior. UNICEF’s research in Moldova
suggests that the increase in the juvenile crime rate between 1993 and 2000 is positively
correlated with a rise in the number of left-behind children, who accounted for nearly
60% of the offenders. In China, some left-behind children fall victim to tragedies4 such
as suicide, abuse, and human trafficking; or they end up as street children and live on
the edges of society. In Mexico, the father’s absence was associated with behavioral
problems: 61% of children left behind suffered from psychological problems and felt
abandoned (UNICEF-UNDP Survey, 2006).
Can migrant parents bring their children with them? Can whole-family migration
solve the left-behind children problem? Indeed, in China, tens of millions of internal
migrant workers bring their children with them to their jobs, and keep them in cities
while they work. According to a survey report by the United Nations Children’s Fund,
in 2010, one out of every four children in China’s urban areas was a migrant child. In
2013, that proportion rose to one out of three—a total of 35.81 million children (Zhang,
2014). However, despite the fact that the children live with their parents in China, the
parents work long hours and are too busy to take care of them. Additionally, the mi-
grant children do not get enough parental care and affection and end up growing up
alone again.
Taking your children with you while migrating is much easier to say than to do. The
barriers to taking young children come from different aspects. It may happen that
the destination countries or cities cannot offer visas for the young children, or parents
with children may not get a job opportunity or can only work part time instead of full
4For example, The Economist October 17th 2015 Page 32 ”In May a teacher in one such” boarding “
school in Gansu province in the North-West was executed for abusing 26 primary-school students. In
Ningxia province in June, a teacher got life in prison for raping 12 of his pupils, 11 of whom had been
left behind.” We can see more cases from Chinese news than what is reported by The Economist.
time and must give up the potential income. It may be simply too costly to bring the
children along, due to housing, food, health care, and other costs. It may also be that
the destination lacks schools for young migrant children, such as for Chinese internal
migrants, or has no incentive at all to invest in infrastructure for schooling migrant
children, given that means more cost than gain in the short-run from such kind of
immigrant policy.
Thus, in this note, we try to study, from economic modeling point of view, the migrant
parents’ optimal choice: leave their children behind or take them, or under which con-
ditions it is actually better to leave their children behind.
The rest of this note proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of migrant
adults’ decision problem. Then, Section 3 provides the solution and discussion, and
Section 4 concludes.
2 The model: Migrants’ choice
Consider an over-lapping generation model of migrants. Suppose each individual is
one household and will live for two periods: youth and old age. The life time utility of
generation t is
Ut = u(ct) + βu(dt+1) + γU
f
t , (1)
where ct and dt+1 are the consumption of youth and old age, respectively, with param-
eter β(∈ (0, 1)) denoting time preference. Following Lucas and Stark’s (1985) altruism
concept, we assume that individuals care also other family members, denoted by U ft ,
with γ(∈ (0, 1)) as the altruism parameter. The other family members could be old age
parents, children, siblings, and so on. For simplicity, we take
U ft = afuf
(cf,t
N
)
+ aK
K∑
k=1
uk(ck,t, hk,t+1), (2)
where cf measures other family members, mainly parents’, consumption;N is number
of siblings who share the cost of the family; ck and hk,t+1 are children’s consumption
and human capital accumulation (schooling), respectively. Suppose there areK− chil-
dren in each household and parents care for them equally. However, we impose a
restriction in which an individual cares for their parents no more for their children,
that is,
Assumption 1 γaf ≤ γaK < 1.
We denote the human capital of migrant workers as ht, which checks ht ≥ h0 with h0 to
measure pure physical labor and no education, training skills, or experience. Suppose
an exogenously given unit human capital wage of wt. Thus, an individual with human
capital ht earns income of wtht that will be used for her (and her family’s) consumption
when young and save st for old age. At the same time, some amount mt will be sent
back home to support parents’ old age and/or raising young children left behind.
Therefore, the migrant faces the following financial budget constraint:
ct + st + g(et) +mt = wtht (3)
where children’s education cost is given by:
g(et) = g
j(et) =
{
Kel, if children leftbehind j = l,
K(em + km), if children immigrant j = m.
Here, km is the children’s relocation cost and could be the opportunity cost for parents
while taking care of their migrant children.
A migrant in the old age part of life, would base consumption on savings from youth
with an interest rate of rt+1. The migrant might earn old age working income, but with
some discounted human capital φht (parameter 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1) andmaybe some exogenous
transfers from adult children and/or a public pension, which we denote by T˜t+1. Thus,
the old age budget constraint is
dt+1 = st(1 + rt+1) + wt+1φht + T˜t+1. (4)
As usual, parents care not only for their children’s consumption, but also their educa-
tion and human capital accumulation, which crucially depends onwhere the education
takes place: as a migrant or left-behind. We modify De Brauw and Giles (2008) and De
la Croix and Deopke’s (2003) formulation of human capital accumulation is as follows:
hjt+1 = h0 +Bj(θj + e
j
t)
ηhα
j
t (hj)
κ, j = l,m, (5)
where parameter η ∈ (0, 1) represents the share of public and parental contribution
to the education outcome, αj is parents’ human capital impact, κ(∈ [0, 1 − η]) is the
effect of the quality of schooling, and hj is the average human capital of teachers. A
positive parameter θj indicates free public education, where, as long as children make
some effort Bj > 0, even if the parents choose not to make any contribution, it is still
possible for children to get some education (see De la Croix and Deopke, 2003). Here,
Bj represents learning productivity, reflecting children’s ability and factors that affect
their motivation and effort.
3 Theoretical results
We take the following logarithm utility function to obtain some clear theoretical results:
Ut = ln(ct) + β ln(dt+1) + γaf ln
(cf, t
N
)
+ γaKK[ln(ck, t) + β˜k ln(hk, t+1 − h0)],
where 0 ≤ β˜k ≤ 1 measures how much parents care about their children’s education
compared to consumption. Here, hk, t+1 − h0 measures the results of schooling or edu-
cation, given the physical care included in the term of ck. In other words, parents’ care
for their children are two-fold: consumption and education. Arguably, the left-behind
andmigrant childrenmay have little physical difference comparedwith other children,
but the substantial difference is their school performance and emotional damage (the
source of the concerns arising from prior studies). It is clear from the above function
form that if Bj = 0, the last term, ln(hk, t+1 − h0) = −∞, and parents do not have an
optimal interior choice.
Therefore, in the following, we focus on the case where Bj > 0, which may differ
depending on whether the children are left behind or migrate with the parent.
Given that the children in our study may be left behind or migrate with the parents,
wemust treat parent and child consumption separately, which differs from the classical
overlapping generation literature, such as De la Croix and Deopke (2003).
If children are left behind and living with their grandparents, we make no distinction
between the children’s and grandparents’ consumption, that is, we assume and nor-
malize this to family consumption cf :
clk = cf . (6)
Then, the migrant adult’s remittance will check
cf, t
N
+Kclk, t ≤ m
l
t + y˜, (7)
in which y˜ is the potential income of those left behind, such as renting out a house or
land to the others. Thus, the migrant’s utility can be rewritten as:
U lt = ln(c
l
t) + β ln(d
l
t+1) + (γaf + ΓK) ln(c
l
f ) + ΓK β˜k ln(h
l
k, t+1 − h0), (8)
with a ΓK = γaKK altruism factor for children.
However, if children migrate with their parents, the remittance to support only the
left-behind family is given by:
cf
N
= mmt + y˜. (9)
The migrants’ utility is
Umt = (1 + ΓK) ln(c
m
t ) + β ln(d
m
t+1) + γaf ln(c
m
f ) + ΓK β˜k ln(h
m
k, t+1 − h0). (10)
Definition 1 We call {cjt , s
j
t , e
j
t ,m
j
t} ( j = l,m) an optimal choice, if it maximizes util-
ity (8) (or (10)) under budget constraints (3), (4), (7) (or(9) ) and children’s human capital
accumulation (5).
Employing the standard first order conditions and substituting the savings, remittance,
and education cost into the budget constraint, it follows for j = l,m that,
clt
(
or
cmt
1 + ΓK
)
(1 + β + γaP +ΓK +ΓK β˜kη) = wtht + y˜ +
T˜t+1 + φhtwt+1
1 + r
−Kkj +Kθj,
with kl = 0 and km > 0. We denoteWt = wtht+ y˜+
T˜t+1+φhtwt+1
1+r
as the lifetime earnings,
which include labor incomes of both periods, potential income back home, discounted
old age social transfer, and children’s remittances. Then, the left hand side is aggregate
lifetime cost, including consumption and accounting for young and discounted old
age, parents’ and children’s consumption, plus the cost to educate children. The right
hand side is the lifetime potential income, which includes lifetime earnings and public
transfers to education net of children’s relocation costs.
We conclude the above analysis in the following:
Proposition 1 There exists one and only one optimal choice, cjt given by
cjt =

(Wt +Kθl)
Λ
, j = l,
[Wt +K(θm − km)](1 + ΓK)
Λ
, j = m
(11)
and sjtandm
j
t , e
j
t are given by:
sjt =

βclt −
T˜t+1 + φhtwt+1
1 + r
, j = l,
β
1 + ΓK
cmt −
T˜t+1 + φhtwt+1
1 + r
, j = m,
(12)
clf
(
1
N
+K
)
= mlt + y˜ = (γaf + ΓK)c
l
t or
cmf
N
= mmt + y˜ =
γaf
1 + ΓK
cmt (13)
and
ejt =

ΓK β˜kη
K
clt − θl, j = l,
ΓK β˜kη
(1 + ΓK)K
cmt − θm, j = m,
(14)
where
Λ = 1 + β + γaf + ΓK(1 + β˜kη).
Substituting the above optimal choice ofmigrants into their utility functions and taking
the difference yields the following results.
Proposition 2 Suppose migrant parents’ choice between taking their children to the destina-
tion and leaving them behind is undetermined; otherwise, migrant parents follow the optimal
choice of Proposition (1). Then, the difference in migrants’ choices is given by:
Um − U l = Λ ln
(
Wt +K(θm − km)
Wt +Kθl
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
income
+(1 + ΓK) ln(1 + ΓK) + γaf ln(γaf )− (γaf + ΓK) ln
(
γaf + ΓK
1 +NK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
altruism effects
+ ΓK lnN︸ ︷︷ ︸
sibling externality
+ΓK β˜k ln
(
Bm(hm)
κ
Bl(hl)κ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
schooling and motivation
.
(15)
Obviously, there is some kind of positive externality from having a sibling to share the
cost of family, which makes it more attractive to leave children behind. To avoid this
confusion, we consider N = 1 in the following, that is, the case in which the migrant
has no sibling.
The utility difference between taking the children and leaving them behind lies in three
terms for migrant parents: income, altruism considerations, and public education.
The income difference includes the potential difference in public education input, θj .
However, taking the children along during migration comes with a relocation cost,
Kkm, which could include costs for visa, entry barriers at the destination, tuition fee,
and, most important, the opportunity cost of losing a job opportunity. If the children’s
relocation cost is too high, migrant parents would be better off leaving their children
behind.
The second term comes from the altruism consideration, which can be rewritten as
(1 + ΓK) ln(1 + γafK) + γfaf ln(γfaf )− (γaf + ΓK) ln
[
γaK(af/aK +K)
1 +K
]
> 0
given Assumption 1 that γaK < 1 and
(af/aK+K)
1+K
≤ 1. In other words, for parents who
care about their children, migrating with the children always increases parents’ utility.
In other words, parents do want to bring their children with them.
The education effect includes two terms: children’s motivation, Bj , and the public
school quality, hj . It is easy to see if left-behind children completely lose interest or
have nomotivation for education at all, that is,Bl → 0
+, while taking themwill change
this, Bm > 0, then it is obvious that taking the children along makes parents better off.
However, if there is no difference in children’s motivation between being left behind
and migrating, Bl = Bm, the difference lies in the potential public school alone.
In the case where the destination has a better education system than the origin, it is
better to bring the children along provided that it is not too costly or problematic for
immigrant parents to take them. Nonetheless, migrant children may face difficulties to
join schools in the destination country or county, or to integrate themselves into the so-
ciety of the destination. But most of the destinations, due to cost consideration and its
own social values, do not have much incentive to invest in infrastructure or facility to
improve immigrant children’s education, especially for international migrant children.
Even inside EU5 where free-moving is one of its fundamental ideas, individual states
do not provide a strong incentive to push forward policy reforms to ease immigrant
children’s education, though there are calls for integrating migrants into their society.
Most of state policies are evaluated in terms of cost-effectiveness rather than merit and
5The European Commission has established the Sirius network6 to improve policy implementation
on migration and education across the EU, has set up a European Policy Network on the education of
children and young people with a migrant background, Erasmus program and so on different policies.
long-term impact. Indeed, in the 2016 British referendum for its EU membership, the
“leave” campaign using immigrant children’s schooling cost as one of their reasons for
Brexit. In China, though policy maker realizes the problem of migrant and left-behind
children, the local governments’ efforts of adjusting hukou system and registration
barriers for migrant children’s schooling are much slower than it should be. Given
that the destination countries or counties do not have much incentive to improve the
education system for migrant children, the left-behind children problem would persist
for long time.
4 Conclusion
A significant number of studies, though not enough, contribute to the left-behind prob-
lem. “Take your child with you” is one of suggestions from scholars. However, our
economic model suggests that indeed, both parents and children are better off emo-
tionally by migrating together as a whole family. However, that may not be possible fi-
nancially. Tomake it possible for children to migrate with the parents, somemore basic
child-related infrastructure at the destination is needed, which would include remov-
ing the barriers to entry, school registration, child health care, and so on. Nonetheless,
none of these are easy tasks.
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